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 Organizational downsizing:
 Constraining,
 cloning, learning
 William McKinley, Carol M. Sanchez, and Allen G. Schick
 Executive Overview  While downsizing rages through the U.S. economy, there is a great deal of
 uncertainty about its bottom-line effects. This uncertainty raises questions about
 why corporations have been so eager to engage in downsizing. In this article,
 we propose an answer to these questions. Three social forces, which we call
 constraining, cloning and learning, frequently provide a major impetus for
 downsizing. We describe these forces, and point out conditions that lead to the
 adoption of downsizing without due regard for its mixed consequences. We
 suggest methods to improve executives' downsizing decision routines ...
 methods that should enhance the chances of achieving intended benefits.
 The Queen possessed a magic mirror, and when she stood before it, gazing at her own
 reflection, she asked, "Mirror, mirror on the wall, Who is fairest of us all?" And it always
 replied, "Thou, Queen, art the fairest of all."
 But one day when the Queen asked her mirror the usual question, it replied, "Thou art
 fair, my Queen, 'tis true. But Snow White is fairer far than you." Then the Queen flew
 into the most awful passion and turned green in her jealousy.
 "Snow White shall die!" she cried. "Yes, though it cost me my own life."
 Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs,
 by Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm
 We shall proclaim destruction-why? why?-well, because the idea is so fascinating!
 But-we must get a little exercise. We'll have a few fires-we'll spread a few
 legends.... And the whole earth will resound with the cry: "A new and righteous law is
 coming."
 The Devils, by Fedor Dostoevsky
 Downsizing, defined here as "intended reductions of personnel," has swept
 rapidly across the landscape of corporate America. Between 1987 and 1991, more
 than eighty-five percent of the Fortune 1000 corporations downsized their
 white-collar staffs.' During the first seven months of 1993, more than 350,000
 American workers faced layoffs. This represents an increase of about a third
 over the comparable layoff rate for recessionary 1991.2 Despite strong evidence
 that the economy is robust, experts believe that downsizing is far from over.
 Over the next two years, companies like GTE, Westinghouse, Gillette, and
 Procter & Gamble will release thousands. In fact, the corporate job reduction
 rate for January 1994 surpassed the equivalent rate for any other month since
 1989.3
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 While downsizing has
 been viewed primarily
 as a cost reduction
 strategy, there is
 considerable evidence
 that downsizing does
 not reduce expenses
 as much as desired,
 and that sometimes
 expenses may
 actually increase.
 Downsizing spreads, despite increasing evidence that it may not be effective in
 achieving goals of cost reduction, increased productivity, and greater
 profitability. Studies suggest that downsizing has a number of negative
 consequences for the morale, commitment, and work effort of survivors. In the
 face of this contrary evidence, why are American corporations downsizing in
 record numbers? It is the purpose of this article to address this question.
 We first discuss some of the problems with downsizing, and review its uncertain
 record in accomplishing bottom-line objectives. We then draw on an established
 theory of organizations-institutional theory-to develop an explanation for
 why downsizing has become so popular, despite ambiguity about its bottom-line
 effectiveness. At the core of this argument is the idea that firms feel pressure to
 downsize because being "lean and mean" has achieved the status of a valued
 attribute-an end in itself. Like the queen obsessed by beauty in the story of
 Snow White, corporations feel a powerful constraint to validate and display the
 trait of leanness. Viewed from a Dostoevskian perspective, American
 corporations are in danger of becoming fixated on job destruction, and on the
 proclamation of downsizing as the "new and righteous law."
 The Trouble With Downsizing
 While downsizing has been viewed primarily as a cost reduction strategy,4
 there is considerable evidence that downsizing does not reduce expenses as
 much as desired, and that sometimes expenses may actually increase. More
 than thirty years ago, James Lincoln warned that the costs of layoffs generally
 outweigh the payroll savings to be gained from them.5 More recently, a survey
 conducted by the Wyatt Company indicated that fewer than half of the
 respondents who were using restructuring as a cost reduction method actually
 met their cost reduction targets.6 Given that layoffs are the most common means
 of downsizing, estimates of the dollar costs of layoffs provide some indication of
 why cost reduction goals are elusive. By one calculation, the direct cost of
 dismissing an employee earning an average salary of $30,000 per year is
 approximately $7,000. Similarly, the cost of hiring replacements can range from
 $5,000 per employee up to $50,000, if relocation expenses are involved.7 Since
 companies have a tendency to replace some dismissed employees, it is clear
 that downsizing can be costly.8 To illustrate, Nynex will take almost $3 billion
 in charges against earnings to cover severance packages.9
 There is also evidence that downsizing has limited effectiveness in enhancing
 productivity. The same Wyatt Company survey mentioned earlier found that
 only 22% of restructuring companies actually increased productivity to their
 satisfaction. Another survey, conducted by the American Management
 Association, put the equivalent figure at 34%. 10 Also, in Cameron, Freeman, and
 Mishra's study of automobile industry downsizing, only a few of the firms
 examined improved productivity relative to pre-downsizing levels.
 Supplementing the Cameron, Freeman, and Mishra findings is a point made by
 Perry: downsizing often eliminates employees with firm-specific skills, leading
 to an interruption in productivity."1
 One of the most important justifications for downsizing is an increase in
 profitability, but here again, the jury is out. One comprehensive study examined
 210 layoff announcements, and collected information on firm financial
 performance in the years immediately preceding and following each layoff
 announcement.12 On the average, net income relative to sales, return on assets,
 and return on equity increased in the first year following the layoff
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 announcements, but not in the year after that. In no case did post-layoff
 performance match the maximum levels achieved prior to the announcements.
 These findings indicate that layoffs are followed by some improvements in
 profitability, but the improvements are temporary, and don't represent a
 recovery to pre-layoff levels. When combined with information available from
 surveys of managers, these results suggest that layoffs are at best a temporary
 stopgap for declining profitability.
 Finally, studies demonstrate how downsizing has negative effects on the
 morale, commitment, and work effort of those employees who survive
 downsizing. When downsizing is accomplished through layoffs, the response of
 survivors is closely linked to the treatment received by the layoff victims. One
 study found that survivors tended to react most negatively to layoffs when they
 identified with the layoff victims who they perceived as having been poorly
 compensated. 13 This study suggests that executives managing layoffs lie
 between a rock and a hard place. Without adequate severance pay,
 outplacement services, and other forms of support to employees being laid off,
 survivors will be alienated. On the other hand, support services to laid-off
 employees increase costs. Either way, costs mount, and managers find
 themselves engaging in repeated rounds of layoffs. Thus, executives become
 trapped in cycles of headcount reduction and declining financial performance.
 Constraining, Cloning, Learning
 Given the uncertainty about downsizing's effectiveness as a cost-reduction and
 profit-enhancing strategy, as well as the negative effects downsizing may have
 on the attitudes of surviving employees, the question arises: why are so many
 companies downsizing? With so many concerns about downsizing, why is it
 spreading like wildfire through the ranks of America's largest corporations?
 We believe that institutional theory provides a compelling answer to this
 question. 14 Institutional theory emphasizes the role of "institutional rules" in
 determining organizational form and process. Institutional rules are norms or
 expectations shared by members of a society or a particular industry. They
 specify how an organization should be structured and the kinds of managerial
 behavior considered legitimate. An example of an institutional rule would be
 the expectation that all large corporations should have a human resource
 management department. An important point made by institutional theory is
 that institutional rules often have little to do with technical or economic
 efficiency. Instead, they function as "myths" to which organizations conform in
 exchange for legitimacy, irrespective of whether conformity enhances efficiency.
 Thus, institutional theory can help us understand why corporations downsize,
 even though downsizing may be costly and may not lead to increased
 productivity or improved financial performance.
 Institutional theorists have identified three specific social forces that explain
 why organizations adopt institutional rules. We use the terms "constraining,"
 "cloning," and "learning" to describe these social forces. s Constraining forces
 pressure organizations to conform to institutional rules that define legitimate
 structures and management activities-the right walk to walk, the right talk to
 talk, the right look to look. Cloning forces pressure organizations to mimic the
 actions of the most prestigious, visible members of their industry. Finally,
 learning forces emerge through the management practices taught in universities
 or professional associations throughout the corporate world. Each of these three
 forces plays a role in the spread of corporate downsizing, as we point out below.
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 As a recent Fortune
 article noted, "The
 chiefs of America's
 biggest companies
 seem caught in the
 grip of what might be
 called wee-ness
 envy-my company's
 workforce is smaller
 than yours."
 Constraining. Social constraints concerning downsizing have shifted in recent
 years, at least in the United States. Downsizing, or workforce reduction, had
 been connected with the concept of decline.'6 As such, downsizing was viewed
 negatively. In recent scholarly and practitioner-oriented writing, however,
 downsizing has been disconnected from the decline concept. As a result,
 downsizing is now interpreted positively, and seems to be attaining the status
 of an expectation. This status is strengthened by a parallel shift in the value
 placed on large size. Once regarded as an indicator of organizational
 effectiveness, large size is now shunned. As a recent Fortune article noted, "The
 chiefs of America's biggest companies seem caught in the grip of what might be
 called wee-ness envy-my company's workforce is smaller than yours."'7
 Reflecting these basic ideological shifts, descriptions of excellently managed
 corporations emphasize the importance of "simple form, lean staff," and
 planned downsizers are described as "heroes."'8 Managers are exhorted to
 shrink their organizations to become more competitive and to achieve
 revitalization. Linking terms like "hero," "competitive," and "revitalization" with
 downsizing helps establish downsizing as desirable. These descriptions
 function in the same way as the legends in the quote from Dostoevsky
 above-they rationalize downsizing as the new "law." The law-like status of
 downsizing is further reinforced by the many articles and books offering
 guidelines for effective downsizing. The social constraint that downsizing's
 taken-for-granted status exerts on CEOs was succinctly captured by Russell
 Baker in a recent New York Times column: "The boss of any large corporation
 that hasn't fired at least enough people to make up an army division has a lot
 of explaining to do to his buddies down at the CEO Club."'9
 As corporations conform to social constraints promoting "leanness," downsizing
 spreads more widely, and becomes attractive as a means of demonstrating
 legitimacy. The pressure to downsize is nowhere more evident than in the
 relationship between large U.S. corporations and the stock market. As noted in
 recent press reports, the investment community appears to have embraced
 downsizing with enthusiasm. These reports carry headlines like "Wall Street
 Hails Beat of Walking Feet" and "How Layoffs Pay Off."20 The anecdotal
 evidence provided by such reports is consistent with findings from large-sample
 research on layoff announcements and stock price changes. One study of 194
 layoff announcements by large corporations found that such announcements
 associated with restructuring or consolidation were followed by increased stock
 prices.21 These results suggest that investors and securities analysts respond
 favorably to downsizing and restructuring, and this can exert a powerful force
 on top managers to downsize. This force is likely to be especially strong if an
 executive's compensation package and bonuses are keyed to the performance of
 the corporation's stock. Even if a CEO doesn't have this kind of incentive
 package, she has to be vigilant about keeping stock prices high, as a defense
 against corporate raiders. The pressures to downsize, and announce it publicly,
 can become overwhelming.
 Cloning. Downsizing spreads through imitation, or "cloning." Cloning is a
 reaction to uncertainty. In the face of the extreme uncertainty generated by
 global competition, rapid technological innovation, and a turbulent legal and
 political environment, organizations have a strong tendency to mimic the
 behavior of other organizations. This cloning behavior applies to downsizing as
 well as to other management techniques: total quality management, process
 reengineering, worker empowerment, self-managing teams, and so on. Like
 35
This content downloaded from 148.61.108.107 on Thu, 13 Dec 2018 21:03:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Academy of Management Executive
 The spread of cost
 accounting techniques
 through business
 education and the
 professionalization of
 accounting therefore
 plays a role in
 rationalizing
 downsizing as a
 legitimate activity.
 these techniques, downsizing seems to have acquired the status of a fad,
 replicating swiftly through numerous corporate sectors. As is true for
 constraining, the incidence of cloning is not dependent on hard evidence that
 the practice being adopted enhances financial performance. Instead, cloning
 derives its appeal from similarity: corporations imitating the downsizing
 activities of other corporations demonstrate that they are in step with the crowd,
 that they are "with it," and that they are actively doing something to address
 problems.
 An excellent example of how cloning operates to spread downsizing is the wave
 of restructuring currently sweeping through the oil industry. The Wall Street
 Journal recently reported that Texaco is restructuring and downsizing in
 response to similar moves by Mobil and British Petroleum. In all, ten oil
 companies-Texaco, Mobil, British Petroleum, Atlantic Richfield, Unocal, Royal
 Dutch/Shell Group, Elf Aquitaine, Exxon, Chevron, and Amoco-are in various
 stages of shrinkage. These corporations have made cost-cutting their "mantra,"
 cloning each other and firms like General Electric and Xerox.22
 It might seem far-fetched to argue that a "hard" strategic decision like
 downsizing could be motivated by cloning. However, research on other strategic
 decisions is consistent with this interpretation. For example, the decision to
 acquire other companies is often justified in terms of bottom-line criteria like
 efficiency, increased market penetration, or shareholder wealth. But a recent
 empirical study found evidence that imitation played an important role in the
 acquisition activities of U.S. corporations. Corporations tended to mimic the
 acquisition behaviors of other firms to which they were linked by directorship
 ties. Similarly, a second study indicated that imitation was a factor in
 diversification by savings and loans into new markets. Thrifts tended to imitate
 the diversification patterns of large, successful competitors, so that the new
 market selections of these prestigious role models became self-replicating.23
 Learning. A third social force that helps spread standard management practices
 through the corporate world is learning. Learning takes place through a
 complex network of educational institutions and professional associations.
 Regarding the specific phenomenon of downsizing, an example of how learning
 promotes downsizing is found in the curricula of U.S. business schools. These
 schools teach successive cohorts of students standard methods of cost
 accounting. Such methods, when combined with decisions to outsource in a
 manufacturing environment, can encourage progressive downsizing of
 production. Given normal techniques of allocating overhead costs, initial
 outsourcing makes remaining components of a manufacturing operation appear
 more costly. This apparent "costliness" increases the motivation to outsource,
 and may set in motion a spiral of incremental outsourcing and downsizing of
 productive capacity. The spread of cost accounting techniques through business
 education and the professionalization of accounting therefore plays a role in
 rationalizing downsizing as a legitimate activity.
 In addition, learning contributes to downsizing through the development of
 careers like that of Jack "The Ripper" Grundhofer.24 Mr. Grundhofer, currently
 the Chairman of First Bank System, is an executive prized for his willingness to
 lay off employees. Grundhofer learned his firing skills at Wells Fargo, "where
 slashing jobs had been a religion." To the extent that downsizing is rewarded in
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 the early careers of U.S. managers like Mr. Grundhofer, and is seen as a route
 to upward mobility, corporate career paths became a context in which
 managers learn to downsize.
 The three social forces described in this section-constraining, cloning, and
 learning-are related, but distinct, causes of downsizing. The distinction
 between them is highlighted by referring back to our oil industry example.
 Constraining forces operate in the oil industry through the promotion of a norm
 that downsizing is good, partly as a result of statements made by securities
 analysts. Cloning forces prompt petroleum companies to imitate one another's
 restructuring initiatives. Finally, an additional pressure for downsizing is being
 created by the positive reinforcement that often follows it-a powerful impetus
 for learning. Specifically, corporations such as Texaco and Mobil have
 experienced stock price increases following their restructuring announcements.
 The combination of constraining, cloning, and learning helps account for the
 wave-like progress of petroleum industry downsizing.
 Constraining, Cloning, Learning-Where Are They Strongest?
 While constraining, cloning, and learning are important drivers of downsizing,
 they do not operate with equal force in all situations. In this section, we identify
 four conditions that enhance the power of these social pressures for downsizing:
 1) dependence; 2) ambiguous performance standards; 3) uncertain core
 technologies; and 4) frequent corporate interaction patterns.
 Dependence. Firms dependent on other parties for critical resources experience
 constraints to conform to the norms advocated by the dominant partners.
 Conformity reduces the probability that a dependent firm will be viewed as
 undesirable, and it "greases the wheels" of the interaction between the parties.
 For example, if a publicly traded corporation has a large percentage of its stock
 held by institutional investors, the corporation is dependent on those investors
 and the securities analysts who advise them. Keeping the goodwill of the
 investors and the analysts is essential to maintaining the stock price, and
 guarding against corporate raiders. If the institutional investors and the
 analysts place a positive value on downsizing, the dependent corporation will
 experience strong constraints to downsize. Downsizing allows the dependent
 company to create a favorable impression, and tap into the positive "legends"
 that are associated with downsizing. Such short-term advantages are
 compelling, no matter what the long-term financial consequences of downsizing
 may be. In fact, the long-term financial results of downsizing are probably
 unknowable, while the myths connected with it-getting lean, strong, fast, and
 fit-are bright, powerful, and immediate. They are constantly repeated in the
 business press, and seem to be taken for granted in many investment circles.
 Thus, dependent firms are willing, even eager, to downsize.
 Ambiguous performance standards. In some types of organizational units,
 performance standards, including standards of financial performance, are
 relatively clear. A good example of such a unit would be a manufacturing plant,
 where performance is assessed in terms of physical output goals, or the
 percentage of capacity utilized. In such units, performance is relatively easy to
 measure quantitatively, and can be used as a yardstick to guide decisions
 about when to downsize. Manufacturing plants, for example, typically downsize
 their workforce and sell off capital assets when the percentage of capacity
 utilized dips below a certain level. Here the zone of managerial discretion open
 to the social pressures of constraining, cloning, and learning is narrow, and we
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 expect downsizing to be determined primarily by changes in performance over
 time.
 However, many organizational units lack clear performance standards. Units
 like corporate headquarters, R&D labs, and new product development teams
 often exhibit little consensus around goals. Given this lack of consensus,
 performance measurements are ambiguous. The uncertainty about performance
 assessment increases the pressure on managers to keep up appearances by
 demonstrating conformity with institutional rules. If those rules include norms
 for downsizing, constraining and cloning will be bolstered as determinants of
 the downsizing process.
 Uncertain core technologies. Just as there are differences in the clarity of
 performance standards, so too are there differences in the uncertainty of core
 technologies.25 Some firms, like brewers, automobile manufacturers, and
 chemical processors, have relatively certain technologies. Few exceptions occur
 in the manufacturing process, and when exceptions do occur, there are standard
 procedures for dealing with them. On the other hand, some businesses have to
 rely on technologies that are much more uncertain. Examples that illustrate this
 category would be consulting firms, advertising agencies, some types of
 retailing, and the film and popular music industries. Here technologies are
 non-routine and unpredictable, because many exceptions take place in the
 production or customer service process, and when exceptions occur, the reason
 for them often isn't clear.
 When a firm's core technology is uncertain, the relationship between means and
 ends is ambiguous. Managers don't know exactly what inputs, or how many of
 them, are required to generate a particular amount and quality of output. For
 instance, uncertain technologies limit management's ability to accurately
 estimate required staffing levels. Therefore, decisions about whether to
 downsize are likely to be governed by what other companies are doing.
 Corporations will be more likely to use downsizing as a means of demonstrating
 legitimacy when they don't have a clear idea of what their optimal size level is.
 Finally, technological uncertainty helps explain why white-collar workers and
 middle managers have taken the big hits in recent episodes of corporate
 downsizing. These employees usually work with more uncertain technologies
 than blue-collar workers, and therefore they have been vulnerable to the
 bandwagon dynamics of downsizing in the 1990s.
 Frequency of interaction. A fourth condition that magnifies the influence of
 constraining, cloning, and learning forces on downsizing is frequent interaction
 between firms. Frequent interaction between competitors, or between customers
 and their suppliers, facilitates imitation of downsizing initiatives. Also, frequent
 interaction encourages the creation of institutional rules that govern acceptable
 behavior and exert pressure toward conformity. The greater the interaction
 among firms, the greater the need for such rules to maintain order. In such an
 environment, a localized norm that "downsizing is good" can quickly become a
 powerful inducement for downsizing.
 Last but not least, frequent interaction is a fertile breeding ground for the
 spread of corporate downsizing through learning. Corporations that hire one
 another's executives, rub elbows at conferences, and use the same consultants,
 tend to learn one another's problems and solutions. This interaction promotes
 learning about how to downsize, and facilitates dissemination of the bright,
 attractive myths that make downsizing so compelling.
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 The strategy of
 acquisition became a
 model that was
 learned and imitated
 by executives through
 sitting on the boards
 of other firms that
 were practicing the
 strategy.
 Empirical studies support the idea that frequent interaction facilitates the
 spread of organizational practices through cloning and learning. One study
 showed that network ties among corporate contributions officers led them to
 mimic one another's patterns of contributions to non-profits.26 The study of
 acquisitions referred to earlier indicated that directorship ties were an
 important channel for imitation of other corporations' acquisition activities. The
 strategy of acquisition became a model that was learned and imitated by
 executives through sitting on the boards of other firms that were practicing the
 strategy. If these interactions promote the cloning and learning of activities like
 charitable giving and acquisitions, it is reasonable to assume that such
 interaction also encourages the cloning and learning of downsizing.
 Exhibit 1 summarizes the discussion in this section by showing the three social
 forces for downsizing and the conditions that promote each of them.
 Social Forces
 Promoted by: Constraining Cloning Learming
 Dependence Yes
 Ambiguous Performance Standards Yes Yes
 Uncertain Core Technologies Yes Yes
 Frequent Interaction Between Firms Yes Yes Yes
 Exhibit 1. Social Forces for Downsizing and the Conditions That Promote Them
 Implications for Managers
 The preceding analysis has a number of implications for managers interested in
 evaluating the appropriateness of a downsizing strategy, and reducing the level
 of external force for downsizing. These implications can be summarized as
 follows: 1) reduce dependence; 2) clarify performance standards; 3) moderate
 technological uncertainty; and 4) disrupt standard interaction patterns.
 Reduce dependence. We argued that dependence on other organizations
 enhances social constraints to downsize, if the dominant partner(s) have bought
 into the assumption that downsizing is good. To reduce such social pressures,
 executives might consider ways of lowering dependence on external
 stakeholders. One means of accomplishing this is the use of employee stock
 ownership plans (ESOPs) or outright employee buyouts of a company's stock. A
 recent example is the successful employee buyout of 55% of the stock of UAL
 Corp., the parent company of United Airlines.27 Employees exchanged wage
 cuts, work rule concessions, and a cash payment for majority ownership of their
 company. The result has been a reduction of labor costs, and an apparent
 softening of the social constraints to downsize associated with stock ownership
 by outside investors. The loosening of such constraints has left the company
 freer to assess staffing levels on technical grounds, and United has recently
 announced its intention to hire more employees.
 Clarify performance standards. Earlier we suggested that unclear performance
 standards increase the tendency of managers to imitate the downsizing
 activities of other corporations. Like the queen gazing into her mirror every day,
 managers seem to be infatuated with downsizing as an end in itself, rather than
 a means to other goals. To make the reasons for downsizing more apparent,
 managers must clarify performance standards, and question downsizing's effect
 on those standards.
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 If managers take an
 incremental,
 experimental
 approach to
 reengineering, they
 can increase their
 chances of achieving
 successful
 company-wide
 restructuring.
 Clear standards replace rationalized myths with specific performance targets.
 Goals like "becoming more competitive," "improving efficiency," "making better
 use of technology," and "becoming more flexible" are illusory targets, because
 they are difficult to measure quantitatively and never fully attainable.
 Managers should be skeptical of downsizing initiatives that are rationalized
 solely in such terms, if improvement in financial performance is the primary
 objective of downsizing. We recommend that executives formulate specific cost
 reduction targets for every downsizing program, paying close attention to the
 costs involved in achieving a given headcount reduction. Payroll costs to be
 saved should be compared with the costs of achieving those savings (e.g., early
 retirement incentives, outplacement support expenditures, continuing medical
 benefits, financial counseling for layoff victims, fees for downsizing consultants,
 etc.). A payback period should be computed, and assessed according to the
 same criteria that govern evaluation of investments directed toward growth.
 Moderate technological uncertainty. Reducing the uncertainty of core
 technologies should help companies increase their understanding of the
 relationship between inputs and outputs.
 Reengineering could be a powerful tool for moderating the uncertainty of core
 technologies, as long as "reengineering" is not just used as a label for programs
 that have downsizing as their primary goal. Our suggestion is that
 reengineering programs concentrate first on understanding the nature of the
 existing processes. This knowledge can then serve as a basis for redesigning
 processes to enhance specific output goals. Consistent with our emphasis on
 clear performance standards, the output goals should be stated in quantitative,
 measurable terms. As a return of reengineering, executives could hopefully
 obtain more accurate estimates of the number of employees required to "run" a
 particular process effectively. If those estimates implied that downsizing was
 warranted, a headcount reduction could be implemented with the knowledge
 that it was driven by technical criteria, rather than ideological constraints or
 cloning responses to uncertainty. If managers take an incremental,
 experimental approach to reengineering, they can increase their chances of
 achieving successful company-wide restructuring. Managers could begin by
 selecting a few organizational units that are similar in terms of important
 demographic and structural characteristics: customers served, geographical
 location, nature of core technology, and so on. Reengineering and any
 downsizing connected with it could be undertaken in one or two of the units,
 holding other units as controls. If the experiments work, then reengineering
 could be rolled out cautiously on a company-wide basis.
 Disrupt standard interaction patterns. Finally, our framework has suggested that
 frequent interaction among industry executives can accelerate the spread of
 downsizing (see Exhibit 1). To counterbalance these dynamics, we recommend
 that executives "disrupt" their normal interaction patterns from time to time.
 This is particularly important if an executive's social interactions revolve
 around close friendships or business associations with other executives whose
 firms are committed to downsizing. Executives may need to extend their
 networks. Anonymous visits to plants, retail outlets, and other working locations
 can generate different perspectives. Above all, the "disruption" process
 introduces variety and diversity into the flow of information that executives
 depend on, reducing the chances that downsizing decisions will simply be the
 product of conformity to what's fashionable in today's executive suites.
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 Conclusion
 In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that we are not opposed to
 downsizing per se, or to corporations that are implementing downsizing
 programs. Instead, our purpose has been to alert managers to the possibility
 that downsizing may be partly driven by social forces, and not motivated
 entirely by predictable financial benefits. Managers engaged in downsizing
 may be sacrificing the long-term health of the corporation for short-term gains
 in shareholder perceptions and short-term illusions of control or certainty.
 Downsizing decisions prompted by ideology and mimicry are at best foolish,
 and at worst dangerous and unethical. Perhaps a nobler challenge to
 management is to make better use of their existing workforce to generate higher
 revenues and increased profits. In other words, executives need to recall the
 benefits of growth. As Wayne Calloway, CEO of PepsiCo, put it recently, "You
 can't save your way to prosperity. That alone won't get you there."28
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 D.M. Noer, Healing the Wounds: Overcoming
 the Trauma of Layoffs and Revitalizing
 Downsized Organizations (San Francisco, CA:
 Jossey-Bass, 1993).
 14 Two of the seminal descriptions of
 institutional theory are J.W. Meyer and B.
 Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations:
 Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,"
 American Journal of Sociology, 83, 1977, 340-363;
 and P.J. DiMaggio and W.W. Powell, "The Iron
 Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
 Collective Rationality in Organizational
 Fields," American Sociological Review, 48,
 1983, 147-160. See also W.W. Powell and P.J.
 DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in
 Organizational Analysis (Chicago, IL:
 University of Chicago Press, 1991).
 5 The technical terms for these three forces
 are coercive isomorphism, mimetic
 isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. See
 DiMaggio and Powell, op. cit., 150.
 16 See, for example, D.A. Whetten,
 41
This content downloaded from 148.61.108.107 on Thu, 13 Dec 2018 21:03:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Academy of Management Executive
 "Sources, Responses, and Effects of
 Organizational Decline," in J.R. Kimberly, R.H.
 Miles, and Associates, eds., The Organizational
 Life Cycle (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass,
 1980), 342-374; and J.D. Ford, "The Occurrence of
 Structural Hysteresis in Declining
 Organizations," Academy of Management
 Review, 5, 1980, 589-598.
 17 L.S. Richman, op. cit., 54.
 18 T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, In Search
 of Excellence (New York, NY: Harper and Row,
 1982); R.M. Tomasko, Downsizing: Reshaping
 the Corporation for the Future (New York, NY:
 AMACOM, 1987), 3.
 19 R. Baker, "The Big Sizing Down," The New
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 Executive Commentary
 A. Catherine Higgs, Allstate Insurance Company
 As McKinley, Sanchez and Schick point out, companies are strongly influenced
 by the way other firms handle similar situations. In recent times, many
 phenomena have converged to make similarity of corporate action more rather
 than less probable. Ease and prevalence of communications such as print,
 television, radio, e-mail or the Internet have led to rapid deployment of
 information about trends. Business people attend the same conferences and
 seminars, participate in the same univeristy-based executive education
 programs, and network with each other in the same professional organizations.
 Strategies which focus on quality and reengineering encourage companies to
 benchmark or do best practices studies. In the process, they come to know who's
 doing what and what they think works best. Most major corporations are, in the
 current buzz words, seeking to "cut cycle time," "reduce costs," and "satisfy the
 customer"-often in the same ways.
 Despite these conforming forces, downsizing seems to me to go beyond a mere
 fad. It's become part of a continuing longer-term aspect of social and economic
 evolution. The current phase of this evolution has been referred to as the
 transition from the industrial to the information age. Not all downsizing is as
 simple as it may look to either the external observer or even to the internal
 executive who uses it. More than shrinking the workforce of an organization,
 much of the change we've seen represents a permanent shift in the social and
 economic structure. What follows are my reasons for drawing this conclusion.
 Trends such as increasing automation of work started well over a decade ago
 with large robotic units installed in manufacturing and assembly plants. In the
 service sector, larger scale computing power meant that efficiency was
 achieved with larger processing centers. Rather than interfere, the shift in
 computing power from large mainframes to current client server networks has
 continued the trend. Work is more automated and tasks of former clerk forces
 are done by intelligent computing. Each new way of automating and
 streamlining tasks has meant that more work can be handled by fewer workers.
 What's more, the former clerk forces and their supervisors are not easily,
 quickly or affordably retrained as knowledge workers. When downsizing
 evolves as part of this industrial-to-information evolution, the primary driver is
 not simply imitation of other companies or response to the currently fashionable
 expectations of investment analysts.
 Another driver of this shift is the aging of the large contingent of baby boomers
 in the workforce. Simply put, some companies who have downsized have found
 no other way of dealing with the quandary posed by the oversupply of
 candidates for the increasingly fewer managerial positions at the top in
 flattened organization structures. During the last ten years, middle and
 upper-level jobs in many firms have been populated with highly paid people
 ready for the next level but with nowhere to go. Companies are asking
 themselves whether this tenure capacity costs more than they can afford,
 particularly if these individuals' skills are more appropriate for the management
 style of a bygone era.
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 The authors' point that companies may downsize because other companies are,
 without anyone knowing if such an initiative really works, is an argument that
 could also be made about many other new business strategies or initiatives.
 The same criteria should be used to determine the viability of a downsizing
 approach as are used in any other business decision-the business case.
 Companies need to ask what they intend to accomplish, how implementation
 will be tracked, and what measures will determine ultimate success. As
 espoused by Mike Vitale of Ernst & Young, or David Norton of Renaissance
 Strategy, this "balanced scorecard" approach simply states that when you lay
 out your strategy, you also specify the key indicators of successful
 implementation from multiple perspectives, including what business payoff you
 anticipate. The multiple perspectives are more than financial; they include
 performance as viewed by customers, improvement of business processes,
 inventions for the future, and the impact on the workforce. Whether downsizing
 or other business fad, this framework of making a business case will at least
 enhance the possibility of success rather than leave you to pursue an untried
 and unproved course of action with indeterminable results.
 Dr. A. Catherine Higgs is director of human resource research at the Allstate Research and Planning
 Center, Allstate Insurance Company. One of her most recent assignments was as a member of the
 reinvention (or reengineering) team for Allstate's home office organization. Dr. Higgs is a member of
 the AME Executive Advisory Panel
 For permission to reproduce this article, contact: Academy of Management, P.O. Box 3020, Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510-8020
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